It is fucking questionable if you are even a materialist at all if you affirm qualia, concept/universals as existing (albeit only within particulars), yet you say you are a radical materialist. U just want to be edgy and call yourself radical
OK, I am asking because in philosophy materialism implies nominalism which is why nominalists are almost always materialists and vice versa. I don't think the two are seperable
They do have souls, although it is different from that of humans. They could have an intellect (I personally doubt this)
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Are you a nominalist, logiko?
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Well qualia just refers to the subjective qualities of sensory experience.
Self-reflection often does not involve...
:MonkeWhat:
which, in the context of describing how the mind works is nonsense because they are saying a material faculty like the brain can account for an immaterial actions like self-reflection or conceptual thought
:kobeha:
>bitches and moans about abuse of language
>also hates dictionaries
Make it make sense
I mean if you are a materialist who is stupid enough to utter words like "projection" as a description of something supposedly non-existent, I guess it makes sense you would call the existence of universals...
They're a projection...I didn't know it was possible to project something that doesn't exist
:Think:
they exist, but immaterially, because materialism is wrong
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No, this is philosophy, not religion.
Well yeah. What I meant was someone could justify something and not be incorrect if nothing is inherently good/evil as Illogikos materialism would imply
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Well, any number of senses. I just meant sensory experience in general
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It's not self contained, it is hierarchical...
if what illogiko says about materialism is true, there can be really no ethics or morals at all to begin with so nothing can be argued as inherently evil. AKA you could justify anything
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